![]() First, he could strongarm the West to start suggesting to Ukraine that it better accept Crimea as part of Russia. ![]() Putin does not need Ukraine as much as he needs to legalize the annexation of Crimea. The water issue is just one part of the larger problem. Naturally, to the Russian audiences, it would be presented as a major victory for Putin, and to a large extent, it would be - the water issue would have been resolved, and Ukraine would have made concessions, including indirect recognition of the new Crimean status. This could easily be “sold” to the Western public as a humanitarian mandate without forcing Putin to renegotiate any key issues. In part, Putin’s current theatrics may be aimed at forcing Ukraine to resume supplying Crimea with water. Prior to the occupation, mainland Ukraine supplied the peninsula with water. So, what does Putin really want from Ukraine? Let’s start with the basics: due to a variety of circumstances, Crimea, annexed by Russia, is suffering from water shortages. Putin can afford only victory, and he will shy away from any hostilities if failure is in the realm of possibilities. In an extraordinary situation, no doubt, he would be prepared to fight, but only with Ukraine, and only with guarantees that Ukraine would receive no meaningful assistance from the outside. Instead, he aims to achieve his goals by scaring the Western elites with the very prospect of war. If his next war becomes protracted and bloody, Putin will face serious problems with his own nuclear electorate, as well as his elites who would never forgive him for the defeat, and possibly would go even further and attempt to oust him in retribution. The Crimean adventure was a success for Putin precisely because it was quick, bloodless, and victorious. While military hostilities could break out at any moment, starting a war is not Putin’s real goal. This belief lies beneath his increasingly aggressive rhetoric and conspicuous concentration of troops along the Ukrainian border. By all accounts, Putin is convinced that the West will blink first and make concessions, no matter what. That reputation for treacherous opportunism has become his trump card in geopolitical games. Today, no one questions whether Putin is capable of aggression. In 2021, the landscape has turned upside down. In Donbass, things were not so easy - in part because Ukraine had begun to resist and had time to repel attacks of the Russian-backed separatists. Putin managed to leverage the element of surprise and achieve victory in Crimea. In fact, what we are seeing in 2021 is the exact opposite of 2014, and something far more sinister is afoot.Ģ014’s attack on Ukraine was a rude awakening for everyone - for Ukraine itself, for Russian society, and for the West. To the casual observer, it might look like a repeat of what we saw in 2014. Things are heating up on the Ukrainian border right now.
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